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## CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE


## BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 February 1960

#### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - USSR: The tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is providing both Peiping and Moscow with an opportunity to point out that their basic unity remains firm, even though there are indications of disagreement on some points. In speeches, editorials, and even poems prepared for the 14 February celebrations, the Chinese emphasize that mutual adherence to Communist doctrine makes the alliance "an unbreakable fraternal relationship." Peiping's commentary harshly attacked the United States, however, and gave no indication that the Chinese allegiance to Sino-Soviet unity would be extended to include accommodation with Moscow's detente tactics toward the United States. (Page 1)

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USSR-Cuba: An agreement for a long-term Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar and the extension of the USSR's usual \$100,000,000 economic development credit indicate a shift from Moscow's attitude of aloofness of the past year to active support of the Castro regime. These agreements and Mikoyan's statement indicating a willingness to supply military material to Cuba "if requested" will be viewed with alarm by some other Latin American states, which have been apprehensive of Cuban developments and of Communist influence in the Castro government.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Somalia: Prime Minister Issa of the Italian-administered UN trust territory of Somalia, which is scheduled to become independent on 1 July, says that within a few weeks the Somali Government will deliver a formal request for arms to the United States, Italy, and Britain. If a favorable response is not forthcoming from a Western supplier, Issa's regime, which has already

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taken steps to establish a 5,000-man army, will probably request arms from the UAR. Cairo last year reportedly offered to equip and train a Somali army.

a UAR "grant" covering the education of Somali students in the UAR's military and air colleges is already being implemented. Addis Ababa, extremely sensitive over claims by Somali nationalists to Ethiopia's large eastern province, can be expected to react vigorously against any strengthening of Somalia's military potential.

Afghanistan-Pakistan: Pakistan has decided to take a strong line in replying to Afghanistan's recent propaganda regarding Pushtoonistan. President Ayub apparently has concluded that in order to persuade Kabul to adopt a more conciliatory line he must make a show of "firmness," even though continuing to hold out the alternative of friendly cooperation. Recent Pakistani radio attacks alleging that the Afghan royal family "sucked the blood of Pushtuns" will probably antagonize the Afghans, however, and result in increased tension along the Afghan-Pakistani border.]

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#### III. THE WEST

French Nuclear Test: The US Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee has issued the following announcement: "The Atomic Energy Detection System has confirmed that the first French nuclear test was a tower shot which occurred at 0604 hours Zulu on 13 February at 26°12'N, 00°12'E, in the vicinity of Reganne, Algeria. Signals have been reported from four seismic stations, six acoustic stations, and six electromagnetic stations.

"A preliminary estimate of the yield is in the range of 20 to 200 kilotons, with the most probable value being about 70 kilotons."

Moscows initial reaction to the French test suggests that the USSR does not intend to use it as an immediate pretext for resuming tests. The official TASS statement warns, however, that if "nuclear explosions should continue," the Soviet Union cannot "fail to draw the proper conclusions" for safeguarding its

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security. In India, Khrushchev expressed "regret" over the French action but stated that he still felt De Gaulle favored a relaxation of international tension.

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West Berlin: Labor leaders are threatening a transportation and utility strike which would cripple the city's economy. A decision to strike, scheduled to be put to a vote on 16 February, would lead to a walkout-possibly for several weeks-of 50,000 workers, involving the entire transportation system and most utilities. A strike could bring possible "sympathy" action from East Berlin. such as cutting off the elevated S-Bahn service. (Page 4)

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## Peiping and Moscow Stress Basic Unity

The tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is providing both Moscow and Peiping with an opportunity to emphasize their basic unity despite indications of disagreement on some points. Pointing out that mutual adherence to Communist doctrine creates an identity of fundamental interests, the Chinese publicize the alliance as "an unbreakable fraternal relationship."

In its comments on the anniversary, Moscow appears to have taken pains to avoid any suggestion of policy differences such as were contained in Khrushchev's speeches last fall after his return from the United States. The Soviet ambassador in Peiping stressed that both countries have actively and consistently supported each other's foreign policy, and he went so far as to specify the communes as being one factor contributing to the success of Chinese economic efforts.

Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a Pravda article praising the alliance, said "The many foreign and political activities of our countries are subordinated to the task of ensuring peace and pursuing Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence." This statement was probably intended to convey an impression of unity on basic issues, while allowing for policy variations on issues of primarily regional importance.

The Chinese, however, avoided endorsement of "peaceful co-existence" which would imply an acceptance of Moscow's current detente tactics toward the United States. On the contrary, Chinese commentary attacked the United States as the implacable enemy of both "socialism and peace," repeated the accusations that "US peace gestures are a disguise for war preparations," and stressed the past and future value of the Sino-Soviet alliance for "smashing imperialist intrigues." This final note indicates that Peiping's allegiance to Sino-Soviet unity will not be extended to include accommodation with Khrushchev's efforts to relax tensions with the United States.

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#### Moscow Ir ates Economic Ties With Cuba

The Soviet-Cuban communique establishing close economic ties and calling for discussions of renewed diplomatic relations "at a convenient time" reveal a shift in Soviet attitude from the aloofness of the past year to active support of the Castro regime. The new relationship will be viewed with alarm by some Latin American states, which have been apprehensive of Cuban developments and of Communist influence in the Castro government.

The agreement to buy nearly 5,000,000 tons of sugar in the next five years means that Soviet purchases in Cuba will increase from an average of \$22,000,000 annually over the past five years—about 4 percent of Cuba's exports—to \$60,000,000 annually at current sugar prices. The USSR has paid cash for about 50 percent of its sugar imports from Cuba in the past few years. Between 1955 and 1958 Moscow's annual sugar imports from all sources have averaged 600,000 tons, and the USSR is attempting to increase supplies for its domestic market.

The barter provisions of the agreement--only 200,000 tons is to be paid for in cash each year--will require Cuba to make substantial purchases in the USSR. Cuban imports from the USSR heretofore have been negligible.

The \$100,000,000 economic aid credit, similar to that rejected by Mexico during Mikoyan's visit there in November, is the usual Soviet offer when no specific development program has yet been prepared. The long-range effect of such a credit would be further to support the growth of Cuba's trade with the bloc.

The USSR's expressed willingness to provide military aircraft "if requested" suggests that Mikoyan did not encourage Cuba to seek military items at this time. The Castro regime, however, probably pressured Moscow to offer military aircraft, which it has been unable to obtain from Western sources. Havana has publicly declared its intention to purchase aircraft from any country willing to sell them and has taken up a public subscription to finance such purchases. There may be a token delivery of military equipment by Czechoslovakia, which received a Cuban purchasing mission last fall.

Another such mission reportedly is now in Prague.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

## Pakistan Intensifies Propaganda Attacks on Afghan Government

Pakistan has decided to intensify its replies to Afghanistan's strongly worded Pushtoonistan propaganda attacks. Rawalpindi apparently has concluded that if it is to persuade Kabul to adopt a more conciliatory line, it must make a show of "firmness" even though it continues to hold out the alternative of friendly cooperation.

Pakistan recognizes the need to improve relations with Afghanistan, but it remains impatient with Kabul's policies and questions the value of a conciliatory approach. Afghan Foreign Minister Naim's visit to Rawalpindi in early January failed to improve relations, apparently because Naim felt Ayub's offers of economic cooperation were overshadowed by his allusions to the strength of the Pakistani Army. The fluctuation in Pakistani policy will probably continue, but the tendency to follow the harder line seems to be growing stronger.

Pakistan's intensified radio counterattacks, accusing the Afghan royal family of "sucking the blood of Pushtuns" and of "flattering their Communist masters," will probably increase Afghan-Pakistani tension, thereby reducing the likelihood of conciliation. Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir, however, believes this language goes beyond his government's intentions, and he apparently intends to try to have it modified.

The Pakistani attacks may be partially intended to discredit		
Afghan-Soviet cooperation in anticipation of Khrushchev's two-day		
visit to Kabul, scheduled to begin on 29 February. The effect,		
however, may be to increase Afghan receptivity to any gesture		
Khrushchev may care to make?		

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#### III. THE WEST

### Crippling Strike Threatened in West Berlin

West Berlin is faced with the possibility of a strike of transportation and utility workers which would affect the city's entire economy. Union leaders, representing 50,000 workers of the city-run public transportation system and utilities (except electric power) as well as of the city government, are planning a strike vote on 16 February in anticipation of deadlocked negotiations by their counterparts in West Germany. The union is demanding a 15-percent wage increase, which the city authorities cannot afford. West Berlin officials have assailed the union leaders' disregard for the city's "special status."

So far there has been no mention of the possible strike in the press or any indication whether the East Berlin Communists would take "solidarity action." In a one-day strike of transportation and utility workers in March 1958, the East Germans halted all service of the S-Bahn (elevated) rail service to West Berlin. Gas and water service was not affected, but in a strike of 36 hours or more, gas and water pressures would drop sufficiently to cause service to be cut off. The union chief claims the strike might last "several weeks," and that the union has financial reserves for two weeks.

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#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission** 

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

**National Indications Center** 

The Director

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